Proof-Carrying Delegation & Multi-Agent Trust
When one agent delegates a task to another, the parent shouldn't have to trust the child's own prose summary of what it did. v0.0.8 adds a delegation envelope that lets a parent verify a child's result from serialized bytes alone.
What a delegation envelope carries
- Parent/child identity and the exact delegated scope.
- The child's real obligation-satisfaction outcome (
Fulfilled,PartiallyFulfilled,Insufficient,Unavailable) — derived from an actual Epistemic Contract assessment, never a self-reported flag. - Freshness/expiry bounds, so a receipt valid for one task cannot authorize unrelated work.
- Lineage referencing prior receipts by digest only — raw evidence is never re-embedded, and free-text scope fields are fingerprinted, never stored raw.
A real, tested scenario
This exact scenario is a real, passing test in v0.0.8
(fornax-receipt::delegation::agent_a_delegates_to_agent_b_and_holds_an_insufficient_result_end_to_end):
Agent A delegates a tests_passed claim to Agent B. Agent B's evidence
collection genuinely fails. Agent A's independent consumer — working from
serialized bytes alone, with no access to Agent B's internal state —
correctly refuses to authorize downstream work, regardless of what Agent B
might claim in its own prose. Stale, tampered (digest-mismatched), and
wrong-scope envelopes are rejected the same way, each with an explainable
reason.
Multi-agent shared failure
Several agents can share one underlying root — the same model call, the same poisoned retrieval source, the same parent task — without genuinely being independent confirmations of each other. v0.0.8 extends this dependency tracking across agents, not just across evidence rows from one session.
A CollusionHypothesis signal is the strongest claim this system can
make, and it is structurally impossible to construct without actual
supporting evidence — never inferred from correlation or text similarity
alone. Weaker, evidence-agnostic signals (SharedFailureRisk,
CommonSource, CoordinationSignal) exist for exactly the cases where
correlation is observed but intent cannot be established.
See also
- Adversarial Evidence & Authenticity
- Agent Evidence Protocol — how a delegation envelope's wire format can be verified by a consumer outside this codebase entirely.